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The Trajectory of Hope:
A Study in the Philosophy of History
of Michael Polanyi

Bruno Manno, S.M.
The study and the proper understanding of history is vital to any rapidly developing
civilization that proposes to itself the continuance of this development along lines that
are increasingly devoted to the ultimate socialization of man, for history is the study of
man in the act of making responsible decisions. Since the end of the nineteenth century
an historical methodology has developed which claims that the humanities, and history in
particular, must be studied by methods other than those of the natural sciences. Emil L.
Fackenheim in an exposition of the doctrine of historicity entitled Metaphysics and
Historicity says:
The doctrine of historicity, then, requires the two above assumptions taken in
conjunction. (a) History is qualatatively distinct from nature because there are
actions performed by man, as well as events which happen to him or in him, and
(b) the distinction between human being and human acting cannot be maintained. 1
Michael Polanyi in his book The Study of Man says the following:
The position at which I have arrived in the previous two lectures denies any
discontinuity between the study of nature and the study of man. It claims that all
knowledge rests on understanding, and that in this sense knowledge is the same
kind at all levels of existence. But this position admits at the same time that as the
subject of our understanding ascends to higher levels of existence, it reveals ever
new comprehensive features, the study of which requires ever new powers of
understanding. But I shall argue also that all the distinctive characteristics of the
historian's method emerge by continuous stages from the progressive modification
of the methods used within science.... The characteristic features of
historiography will thus be shown to emerge by the cont inuation of a development
broadly prefigured already within the natural sciences. 2
The first assumption of the doctrine of historicity as stated by Fackenheim and
elaborated upon in his book is in contradiction with Polanyi's stated position. It will be
my purpose in this paper to explicate the reasons for Polanyi's position and why I believe
them to be true. I will do this by first elaborating the main reasoning underlying
Fackenheim's presupposition. I will then present Polanyi's position on the matter and
close with some personal reflections.
Fackenheim, in explicating the reasons behind his first presupposition, accepts R. G.
Collingwood's distinction between action and event. He says in following Collingwood's
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reasoning:
History consists of actions performed by man, not of natural events which happen
to him; and the latter are historical only by their relation - potential or actual - to
the former. Caesar's decision at the Rubicon, or Napolean's fate at Waterloo, are
historically primary. An eruption of Mount Vesuvius or an earthquake in San
Francisco are part of history only secondarily, because they are a challenge to
human action. And if they occurred on a star on which no men actually live, they
would not be a part of history at all. 3

If this distinction is not maintained, history reduces itself, according to Fackenheim's
reasoning, "to a mere species of natural processes, different from other kinds only in that
it happens in or to man.,,4
Polanyi, as previously mentioned, sharply disagrees with this distinction and
conclusion. In trying to follow Polanyi's reasoning, one should keep in mind that he was
originally, by profession, a physical chemist. He turned to philosophy only as an
afterthought to his career as a distinguished scien tist. I believe it is important, though, to
investigate some of the backround to Polanyi's decision, for it explains the general task
toward which all of his writings are directed.
Polanyi encountered questions of philosophy when evaluating for himself the general
impact made by the Russian Revolution on the minds of men everywhere. Scientific
research in Soviet Russia after the revolution was divided into two sections. One was
conducted by scientists who worked freely and who were in constant touch with Western
scientists. The other was conducted in the light of dialectical materialism under the
leadership of the Communist Academy founded in 1926. In 1932, the Soviet govern men t
repudiated and ridiculed the dialectical speculations of the Communist Academy. It also
forced, though, the other group of scientists to acknowledge the supremacy of dialectical
materialism. At Easter in 1935, Polanyi visited N. I. Bukharin in Moscow. He recalls the
conversation he had with him:
I remember a conversation I had with Bukharin in Moscow in 1935. Though he was
heading toward his fall and execution three years later, he was still a leading theoretician of the Communist party. When I asked him about the pursuit of pure science in
Soviet Russia, he said that pure science was a morbid symptom of a class society;
under socialism the conception of science pursued for its own sake would disappear,
for the interests of scientists would spontaneously turn to problems of the current
Five-Year Plan. 5
The denial of the existence of independent scientific thought stunned Polanyi and moved
him to inquire as to what philosophy of science the Western world had to combat this
denial of the intrinsic creative powers of thought. This search led Polanyi to his novel
understanding of scientific knowledge, and, in general, all knowledge. The "objective
scientific viewpoint" came to be viewed as absurd by Polanyi. In all of his writing, and
especially his book Personal Knowledge, he demonstrates the fact that into every act of
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knowing there enters a tacit and passionate contribution of the person knowing what is
known. It is on this basis that Polanyi says that all human knowledge is structured in the
same manner, and that any attempt to sever fact from value, science from the humanities,
is absurd. Polanyi reaches his conclusion by surveying the rising stages of comprehension
within science up to the humanities and shows how comprehension becomes
progressively more intense and complex. In his monumental work Personal Knowledge he
says:
Knowing is the act of extending our person into the subsidiary awareness of
particulars which compose a whole. The inherent structure of this fundamental act
of personal knowing makes us both necessarily participate in its shaping and
acknowledge its results with universal intent. This is the prototype of intellectual
commitment.
It is the act of commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge from
being merely subjective. Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision , in
submission to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be
true. It is an act of hope, striving to fulfill an obligation within a personal situation
for which I am not responsible and which therefore determines my calling. This
hope and this calling are expressed in the universal inten t of personal knowledge. 6
Polanyi begins his line of reasoning by saying that man seems to be affected by what
he refers to as a "peculiar logical oddity.,,7 The more man tries to explicate and in so
doing objectify his knowledge, the more he fmds that this task is impossible. He says:
Man must try forever to discover knowledge that will stand up by itself, objectively,
but the moment he refleCts on his own knowledge he catches himself red-handed in
the act of upholding his knowledge. 8

Man then finds himself in the position of never being fully able to explicate that which he
knows. As Polanyi puts it, "We can know more than we can tell.,,9 This leads him to
conclude that human knowledge is of two kinds. That knowledge which is set ou t in
written words or maps or mathematical formulae is referred to as explicit knowledge or
knowledge which has been formulated, while that which is unformulated or of which we
are in the act of doing is called tacit knowledge. There is an "essential logical difference"
between these two kinds of knowledge'! 0 This lies in the fact that one can critically
reflect on something explicitly stated while one cannot reflect on our tacit awareness of
an experience. There is only one way to test that mental map of knowledge which is
pre-articulate or tacit and that is by actually using it as my guide. This inarticulate
knowledge which can only grope its way by plunging from one view of things to another
is called "a-critical" by Polanyi. 11
Polanyi now goes on to say that this tacit knowledge is the dominant principle behind
all our knowledge. He illustrates this with the following example:
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It is true that the traveller, equipped with a detailed map of a region across which
he plans his itinerary, enjoys a striking intellectual superiority over the explorer
who fIrst enters the new region - yet the explorer's fumbling progress is a much
fIner achievement than the well-briefed journey of a traveller. Even if we admitted
that an exact knowledge of the universe is our supreme mental possession, it would
still follow that man's most distinguished act consists in producing such knowledge;
the human mind is at its greatest when it brings hitherto unchartered domains
under its control. Such operations renew the existing articulate framework. Hence
they cannot be performed within this framework but have to .rely (to this extent)
on the kind of plunging reorientation which we share with the animals. 12

Polanyi then goes on to say that the structure of tacit knowing is manifested most clearly
in the act of understanding which is a process of comprehending, of grasping isolated
parts into a whole entity. He here acknowledges his indebtedness to Gestalt psychology
for the notion of seeing particulars in terms of their wholes. When one is aware of
particulars in terms of a whole, he possesses a subsidiary awareness of the particulars
which contrasts with a focal awareness which would fix attention on the particulars
themselves, and not as parts of a whole. 13
In summarizing these thoughts, Polanyi concludes that the theory of knowledge he
advocates is neither objective nor subjective but personal.
It says that no meaningful knowledge can be acquired except by an act of
comprehension which consists in merging our awareness of a set of particulars into
our focal awareness of their join t significance. Such an act is necessarily personal
for it assimilates the particulars in question to our bodily equipment ; we are aware
of them only in terms of the things we are focally overseeing. 1 4
In the essay "The Calling of Man" Polanyi goes on to say that the two levels of
personal knowledge , that of a comprehensive en tity and that of its particulars, represent
two distinct levels of reality. IS Between these two levels of reality there exists a "peculiar
logical relationship" that is derived from the distinction between subsidiary and focal
awareness. He then proceeds to erect on top of these a consecutively rising set of levels
that culminates in responsible human personhood. His idea of the ordered development
of these levels culminating in man is the key to his understanding of history.
Polanyi explains these two levels of reality in terms of machines. He says that the two
levels of reality that correspond to the two levels of knowledge are composed of machines
on the upper level and parts of machines on the lower level. The upper of these two levels
is, in fact, unspecifiable in terms of the lower. It is here that Polanyi makes use of his
scientifIc backround in illustrating this example.
Take a watch to pieces and examine, however carefully, its separate parts in turn,
and you will never come across the principles by which a watch keeps time. This
may sound trivial, but is actually of decisive significance. For the study of
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inanimate objects constitutes the science of physics and chemistry and the study of
machines forms the sciences of engineering, and we may conclude, therefore, quite
generally, that the subject matter of engineering cannot be specified in terms of
physics and chemistry. Let loose and army of physicists and chemists to analyse
and describe in utmost detail an object which you want to identify as a machine,
and you will fmd that their results can never tell you whether the object is a
machine and if so, what purpose it serves and how. 16
Even though the two levels of reality just mentioned cannot be identified, there is, as I
have mentioned above, a "peculiar logical relationship" between the two. This
relationship exists in the fact that parts of machines are not useful in themselves. Only
technology, which sets forth the rational means or operational principles within which
these particulars operate, can permit a machine to achieve its true purpose.
Polanyi now moves on to a series of ascending levels of far greater importance. The
first of these is reached by including among machines the machine-like aspects of animals.
But, he says, animals are not just machines. They possess an active center which performs
a specific function that machines cannot perform without the aid of an outside force. He
says:
Such a center coordinates the animal's voluntary movements under the guidance of
its perceptions for the purpose of satisfying its cravings or allaying its fears. It is the
appetitive-perceptive agency within the animal. The patterns of animal behaviour
governed by such centers are largely innate, but all animals, from worms upwards,
can learn new habits adapted to the necessities and opportunities of the new
situations .... The appearance of such a center clearly opens up a new level of
existence, lying above the machine-like automatism or "regulative" processes that
constitute life on the lower, physiological, level. Indeed, this center of hazardous
believing and acting already prefigures the center of true intellectual commitment
in man. 17
Polanyi now has set forth for us two levels of objects. The first was machines and the
physiological operations of living beings which, he says, can be either in working order or
out of working order. The second was the level of appetitive-perceptive centers where the
assessment of rightness and wrongness can be leveled. 18 The next level to be considered is
the level of man. What is it that distinguishes man from the animals even if they both
possess rational centers of operation? Polanyi says:
Animals may be lovable, but only man can command respect, and in this sense we
humans are the top of creation .... Chimpanzees may show distinct signs of
mental strain and they clearly enjoy successful ingenuity; but from these faint
stirrings of pure intelligence, man alone has developed in his noosphere a whole
universe of mental passions. By contrast to his bodily passions, which man shares
with the animals, the satisfaction of his mental passions does not consume or
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monopolize the objects which gratify it; on the contrary, the gratification of mental
passions creates objects destined to gratify the same passions in others. A discovery,
a work of art, or a noble act, enrich the mind of all humanity. Man, hitherto self
centered, enters thereby on a partipation in timeless and ubiquitous things.19
Polanyi here sets man in the cosmic perspective of space and time and goes on to further
clarify this cosmic perspective of man. As far as man knows, he is the only bearer of
thought in the universe. From the study of evolution one is brought to the conclusion
that this gift of thought has not been a feature of terrestial life from the start of this
universe. Centuries of evolution have led to this result only in us human beings. The
unique task of man, therefore, seems to be to engage in thought responsibility. He
concludes by saying:

If this perspective is true, a supreme trust is placed in us by the whole of creation,
and it is sacrilege then even to contemplate actions which may lead to the
extinction of humanity. Nothing then can justify such actions in any circumstances.
I believe that no one who thankfully acknowledges man 's calling in this universe, be
he religious or agnostic, can avoid this ultimate preemptory conclusion. 2 0
This investigation just completed has taken us from the study of the most fundamental
components of inanimate objects - atomic components of reality - to the most complex
of all purposive objects - man thinking and acting responsibly within a cosmic
perspective of space and time. It has been a passage from those forms of existence which
are specifiable in terms of physics and chemistry to that form of life which transcends all
physics and chemistry but is logically related to it at the same time. This development has
been shown to become more penetrating and more complex at every stage. It has also
become more progressively personal and intimate. It is here, in the interpersonal aspect,
where the study of history has a different appeal from 't hat of the study of nature. No
knowledge of nature lacks some measure of indwelling of the observer in his subject
matter. The intimacy of this indwelling shows a continuous progression from the
inanimate objects of physics and chemistry towards that fullest indwelling within man
which is characteristic of the historian. History, within this perspective, refers to a
distinctive level of reality and is to be seen, then, at the end of a row of sciences of
increasing intimacy and complexity which differs only by a much more personal
participation in the subject matter at hand. 21
In his book Personal Knowledge, Polanyi goes into greater detail in regard to the ideas
presented above. He has two interesting comments that summarize very well the above
difference between scientific and historical interest that I have attempted to demonstrate.
He says in one place:
The difference between scientific and historical interest, moreover, arises not from
the uniqueness of historical events but from their interpersonal appeal . .. . The
historical interest of past events depends, like the scientific interest of facts, on
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their bearing on a scholarly context: in this case the context of history.
Admittedly , the appeal which this context makes to the historian is again
interpersonal and thus different from the claim made by a mathematical theory on
the attention of the scientist. 2 2
In another place, after he had just finished explaining the relationship between and
movement from a scientific formula to the arts, he says:
A parallel movement takes place ... in passing from the relatively impersonal
observation of inanimate objects to the understanding of living beings and the
appreciation of originality and responsibility in other persons. These two
movements are combined in the transition from the relatively objective study of
things to the writing of history and the study of art. 23
We have now reached the end of this inquiry into the study of history and its relation
to the study of nature. I would now like to close with some personal reflections on why
this view appeals to my own mental passions, to use the phrase that Polanyi says
distinguishes man from all other forms of inanimate and animate objects.
It seems to me that this description of the gradual growth in personalization from the
study of physics and chemistry to the study of man himself describes perfectly the thesis
of all those who speak of the socialization of mankind. This socialization is a growth in
the interpersonal. The history of socialization, the history of evolution, is a history of the
growth of the personal. All things have led to man and man is now urged to pursue
greater personalization in the future. He is, therefore, orientated toward the future and is
responsible for creating the future he desires. Polanyi, himself, has said:
I can't imagine a more exciting time in history. There are no rules; nothing that ever
existed binds us anymore. The old order in science and human affairs is gone. 24
Man can no longer blame the gods for those evils which he has encountered. He has only
himself to blame. This does not deny the existence of God, but puts our understanding of
him within a different perspective. Polanyi tells us that fallen man in this perspective can
be equated to the historically given condition of man and pure subjective state of our
mind. Our redemption lies in the fact that we lose ourselves in the performance of an
obligation which we accept, in spite of it appearing to be impossible of achievement upon
our first reflection. Man undertakes this task of attaining the universal in spite of his
admitted infirmity, for, Polanyi says, he hopes to be visited by powers which he cannot
account for in terms of our specific capabilities. This hope, Polanyi says, is a clue to the
understanding of what the term "God" could well symbolize. 2 5
This thrust towards higher and more complex levels of organization presents man with a
challenge calling forth a response that demands the use of his creative soul in a manner in
which he has never been challenged before. Within this framework , education can no
longer be seen as the great transmitter of the past tradition but must be seen as the
developer of those distinctive qualities which the man of this age must possess . 2 6
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In this growth toward ultimate socialization in the noosphere, an individual man does
possess the power to hinder the process by refusing to acknowledge the sanity of another
man's mind. This is our "original sin" and the state of subjective man. We can
acknowledge the sanity of another man's mind, though, by paying respect to him.
Throught this act of appreciation, we enter into fellowship with him and further this
process of socialization. In this act, then, is our true salvation - in acknowledging that
each man possesses the power to rise above himself and commit himself to a set of
universals and judge responsible those actions he desires to perform. 2 7 I t is on this basis
of a shared fellowship, and this basis alone, that, I believe, man must build his future.
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NOTE: A Polanyi Studies Group, comprised of faculty and students of the University of Dayton and
neighboring campuses, has been formed at U.D. The study group will investigate the
intricacies of Michael Polanyi's thought, in order to clarify and expand it. Communications on
Dr. Polanyi's work will be welcomed by the Review.
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